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Lecture Four
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The
Question of Abrogation
The Question of Abrogation
A- Abrogation
Our discussions have been about Islamic jihad. Tonight, there are three
issues that I wish to speak about, one of which has a Quranic basis, the
other, reason as a basis, and the third, has both a Quranic basis and a
historical one.
The issue that has the Quranic basis is in connection with the Quranic
verses about jihad. Before, we had said that some of the
verses about jihad are unconditional while others are conditional.
Unconditional verses are those where the command to fight the polytheists
or the People of the Book has been issued without any conditions and conditional
verses are those which have given the command accompanied by special conditions.
For example, it has been stated that we must fight them if they are fighting
us, or if they are in a state of war with us, or if we have reason to fear
an imminent attack from them. To the question as to which verses should
be observed, the conditional or the unconditional, we say that in the view
of the ulema, there exists no difference of opinion to leave us in doubt,
for, if we are aware of the rule and we study both types of verses, we
will realize that the conditional verses are explanations of the unconditional
ones. So, according to this, we must get the meaning of jihad from what
is explained by the conditional verses, which means that the Quranic verses
do not recognize any verse about jihad as being obligatory.
Yet, some commentators have brought up this issue of abrogation. They
agree that many verses of the Quran set conditions for fighting against
the non-Muslims, but they say that other verses have been revealed that
abrogate all those instructions and conditions. Thus, we come to abrogations,
about that which abrogates and that which is abrogated. Some think that
the first verse of Surah at-Tawba - which issues the complete command of
jihad and immunity to the polytheists, fixing a period for them to stay
in Mecca after which they had to leave and the Muslims were to besiege
them in their fortifications and hiding places and kill them, and which,
furthermore, was revealed in the ninth year of the Hejira - has in one
blow abrogated all the instructions about jihad that were previously revealed.
Is this the correct view?
No, this view is incorrect. Why? For two reasons. One is that we can
only consider a verse to have abrogated another when it is incompatible
with it. Imagine a verse being revealed commanding not to fight the polytheists
at all followed by another allowing for fight. Good. This would mean that
God has canceled the previous instruction. This is the meaning of abrogation,
that the first instruction is annulled and replaced by another. So the
second instruction must be such that it is fully incompatible with the
first. However, if collectively, the contents of the first verse and the
second one are compatible, so that one clarifies the other, then there
is no further question of one being an abrogator and the other being abrogated.
The verses of Surah at-Tawba are not such that they can be said to have
been revealed so as to nullify the previously revealed ones, which attached
conditions to jihad. Why not? Because, when we consider all the verses
of Surah at-Tawba collectively, we see that they tell us to fight the polytheists
because they do not observe one of the essential principles of humanity
- keeping one's promises - which one and all know, must be kept, even if
the law of one's particular nation does not stress this duty or heed it
at all. Thus the verses tell us to fight, because if we conclude an agreement
with them. whenever they see the opportunity to violate it, they would
do so and strive to destroy and annihilate us. Here, what does reason tell
us? If we know for sure that a nation intends to destroy us on the first
opportunity, does reason tell us to wait for them to do so before we do
anything about it? If we wait, they will destroy us. In today's world,
we may see a nation attacking another because of clear evidence that the
other nation has made the decision to attack them, and when that nation
attacks, the whole world will say that it is permissible, that they did
the right thing. No one would say that although they knew and had clear
evidence that, for example, the enemy had the intention of attacking on
a certain day, yet they had no right to attack the enemy today, that they
should have waited
with folded arms for the enemy to attack and only then, should they
have gone into action themselves.
The Quran in those same verses of Surah Bara'at, the most strict verses
of the Quran, tells us:
«What! And if they prevail over you, not observing any relationship
with you, nor treaty. They mollify you with their
mouths while their hearts are adverse to you.» (9:8)
It tells us that, if they find the opportunity, they observe no promise
or treaty, and whatever they say comes only from their tongues, while their
hearts are in opposition. So these verses are not so unconditional as has
been thought. What they actually say is that, on sensing danger from the
enemy, for us to fold our arms and delay would be a mistake. Thus we must
not think that these verses are completely out of accord with the other
verses and they should not be considered as abrogators. This is the first
reason why these verses are not abrogative.
B- No Generality
without an Exception
The second reason was given by the ulema of usul ul-fiqh - and if I
can explain it to you, then the meaning concerning this verse will become
clear.
The ulema say:
"Maa min 'amman illa waqad khussa"
"There is no generality that is without an exception." And this is absolutely
right. We are told to fast, but not when we are ruled as traveling, or
too sick. There are similar exceptions generality that has no exception.
Even this very rule has exceptions. There are some generalities that really
have no exceptions and admit none.
The point of this is that some issues refuse to be abrogated, refuse
all exceptions. The tone of these generalities is that they can admit no
exceptions. For example, in the Quran we are told:
«If you are thankful God is pleased with it.» (39:7)
and to this there can never be any exception. It is not possible that
there will come a time when a person will be sincerely grateful to God,
and God will not be pleased. No. This is not something that in certain
circumstances will be any different, unless that person becomes ungrateful.
Similarly concerning abrogation, some verses are such that undamentally
abrogation is not applicable to them because the
meaning of abrogation is that the abrogated order was a temporary order.
This means that certain things do not admit being temporary. If they be,
they must always be. Why? Now I will give you an example.
For example, let's take the verse of the Quran which tells us:
«And do not transgress, God loves not the transgressors.»
(2:190)
This has a generality in regard to individuals and a continuity in regard
to time. Is it possible for us to maintain exceptions to this
generality? Can we say that God does not like oppressors with the exception
of a few? The holiness of divinity on the one hand and the filth of zulm,
of injustice and oppression on the other are not two things that go together
for us to be able to say that God does not love transgressors with the
exception of so and so. This is a generality that admits no exception.
This is not like fasting where we say that we must fast unless we are in
such and such a condition. As regards fasting it is possible that in a
certain state a person must not fast, but zulm is not a thing whereby we
can say that in one instance we must be unjust and in another we must not.
Wherever there is injustice and oppression, it is wrong and a crime, irrespective
of who has committed it. Even if it were the prophets of God who committed
it, still it would be blameworthy, and regarded as sin and disobedience.
God does not love anyone who is disobedient. We cannot say "except the
injustice of His prophets." Even this is unacceptable. Even if the prophets,
(may God spare me for the thought) committed sins, they would not be loved
by God. The difference between a prophet and others is not that he committed
sins and God loves him nevertheless; but that he never commits any sin
while others do. This, then, is a generality which admits no exceptions.
Concerning the time factor also, the same thing applies.
Can it be said that a certain fact pertains to a certain time? That
God loves transgressors for a while, but then changes His mind,
cancels His original position, and says that thereafter, He loves transgressors?
No, this is a thing that admits no abrogation.
We can see how in one of the verses about jihad the Quran says:
«And fight in the way of God with those who are fighting with
you and do not transgress, God loves not those who transgress.» (2:190)
With those who fight us, with those who have commenced some type of
aggression against us, we are to fight. But we are not
ourselves to be aggressors. Fighting against aggression is not aggression.
But fighting against other than aggression is aggression
and not lawful. We are to fight against aggression so as to eliminate
aggression; but if we fight against other than aggression then we ourselves
become aggressors. This is not something that admits abrogation. It is
possible, for example, that permission for jihad and self-defense be withheld
for a while in our own best interests, for us to endure and persevere for
a while and then, later, the call for jihad is given, meaning that the
command to be patient is canceled because it was only for a limited period.
The cancellation of this command is because from the very beginning it
was meant to be a temporary one.
C- Defense
of Humane Values
According to this, the Quran limits jihad strictly to a type of defense
and only permits it in the face of aggression. But in our last lecture,
we said that jihad for the expansion of human values, even if they are
not threatened, cannot be condemned, and we also said that the meaning
of aggression is a general one, meaning that it is not necessary for aggression
to be against life, against property, against chastity, against land -
it is not even necessary for it to be against independence, against freedom
- if a group transgresses against values that are counted as human values,
then this is aggression.
I wish to cite a simple example. In our age, huge efforts are being
directed at uprooting various diseases. So far the primary causes of some
diseases like cancer have not been discovered, and their cure is likewise
still not known. But at present, there exists medicines which can temporarily
delay the effect of these diseases. Supposing that some institution discovers
the cure to one of these diseases, and that those other institutions which
profit from the very presence of that disease, those factories which manufacture
the medicines that can be used to postpone the effects of that disease,
in order to prevent their market from collapsing - in which case millions,
billions of dollars would be lost - destroy that newly discovered cure
which for humanity is so beneficial; destroy those who are connected with
it; destroy the newly discovered formula so that no one would know about
it. Now, is such a human value to be defended or not? Can we say that no
one has attacked our lives or our property, no one has interfered with
our chastity, our independence or our territory, but that in one of the
corners of the world, somebody has
made a discovery and someone else is trying to destroy it, and ask,
what has it got to do with us? No. This is not the place for such a question.
Here a human value is being threatened. In such a case, if we take the
stance of resistance and war, are we to be called aggressors? No, we have
risen to oppose aggression, and to fight the aggressors.
So, when we say that the basis of jihad is defense, we do not mean defense
in the limited sense of having to defend oneself when one is attacked with
the sword, gun or artillery shell. No, we mean that if one's being, one's
material or spiritual values are aggressed or in fact, if something that
mankind values and respects and which is necessary for mankind's prosperity
and happiness, is aggressed, then we are to defend it.
Here, we come again to our previous discussion about whether tawhid
is a personal issue, whether it is one of the values of humanity. If it
is the latter that must be defended, so that if amongst a set of laws there
is one which dictates that tawhid must be
defended on the principle of it being a basic human value (as in Islam,
for example), this does not mean that aggression is
considered lawful. It means that tawhid is a spiritual value and the
meaning of defense is so wide that it includes the defense of spiritual
values.
Nevertheless, I will again repeat that Islam does not say we must fight
to impose tawhid, for tawhid is something that cannot be
imposed because it is faith. Faith is built on discernment and choice,
and discernment is not influenced by force. The same applies to choice.
"La ikraha fid-din" means we must not compel anyone for faith is not something
that can be forced upon someone. However, "La ikraha fid- din," does not
imply that we are not to defend the rights of tawhid. It does not mean
that, if we see "La ilaha illallah," "No god but Allah," being threatened
from some direction, we are not to defend it. No, not at all.
D- Freedom
of Belief, or of Thought?
That religion must not be imposed on the individual and that people
must be free in their choice of religion is one thing. That belief, however,
in the current phraseology, must be free, is quite another. In other words,
whereas freedom of thought and choice is one thing, freedom of belief is
quite another. Many beliefs have "thought" for a foundation, meaning that
many beliefs have been discerned and found to be true and have been freely
chosen. The alignment and commitment of an individual's heart to his beliefs
in many cases is built on discernment and selection, but are all human
beliefs built on thought, discernment and selection? Or are the majority
of mankind's beliefs no more than alignments and commitments of the human
soul that have not the slightest relationship to thought at all, that have
a mere sentimental basis? An example the Quran cites on the subject of
imitation by one generation of the previous generation is:
«Verily we found our fathers on their creed and verily we are
followers of their footsteps.» (43:23)
The Quran puts great stress on this point, and the same applies to a
belief that is formed by the imitation of the patricians of society. In
such places, the phrase freedom of belief is completely without meaning,
for freedom means the absence of obstacles to the activities of an active
and advancing force, whereas this type of belief is a kind of constriction
and stagnation.
Freedom in constriction is equal to the freedom of a prisoner condemned
to eternal imprisonment, or of a man chained in heavy
chains, and the only difference is that he who is physically enchained
senses his condition, while he whose spirit is in chains is unaware of
it. This is what we mean when we say that freedom of belief based on imitation
and environmental influences, rather than on freedom of thought, is totally
meaningless.
E- "Jezyah"
The final issue to be discussed is jezyah, i.e. tribute. In one of the
Quranic verses, it has been revealed that we are to fight the People of
the Book unconditionally or those who do not have real faith until they
pay jezyah. What is jezyah? Is the meaning of jezyah some kind of "protection
money" or "danegeld?" Were the Muslims who took jezyah in the past taking
protection money? Protection money, seen from any angle, is injustice and
oppression and the Quran itself negates it in all its forms. Jezyah finds
its root in the word jaza. Jaza in the Arabic language is used both for
reward and for punishment. If jezyah in this context means recompense or
punishment, then it can be claimed that its meaning is "protection money"
or "danegeld," but if it means a reward, which it does, then the matter
changes.
Previously we said that some have claimed that jezyah is fundamentally
a non-Arabic word, that it is originally Persian, that it is the Arabicized
form of the Persian word "gaziyeh," the name of a head-tax which was first
introduced by the Persian king, Anoushiravan, and that when this word reached
the Arabs, the "gaf" ("G") was changed into a "jim" ("J") in accordance
with the normal rule, so that the Arabs instead of saying "gaziyeh", called
it "jezyah." Thus, jezyah means a tax, and paying taxes is not the same
as extorting protection money. The Muslims too must pay taxes and the only
difference is between the actual types of taxes that the Muslims have to
pay and those the People of the Book have to pay. There is no proof however,
for this view, that the origin of the word is not Arabic, and furthermore,
we have no immediate interest in this word. Whatever the root of the word
may be, what we must do is find out the nature of jezyah from the laws
that Islam has introduced for it, and by which it is defined practically.
To put it in a different way, we must look to see whether Islam considers
jezyah to be a reward or a punishment. If in return for
the jaziyah, Islam makes certain undertakings, gives us certain services,
then the payment of the jezyah is its reward. If, however, it takes the
jezyah without giving anything in return, then it is a kind of protection
money. If there is a time when Islam
tells us to take jezyah from the People of the Book without giving
anything in return, tells us just to take money from them or
otherwise fight them, then it is protection money. Taking protection
money means taking the right to use force. It means that the
strong tell those who are weaker to give a sum of money if they want
to be left alone and if they do not want interference or
their security be destroyed. If, on the other hand, Islam says that
it places an undertaking before the People of the Book and in
return for that undertaking they are to pay jezyah to Islam, then in
this case, the meaning of jezyah is a reward, whether it is an Arabic word
or a Persian word. What we must pay attention to is the nature of the law,
not the nature of the word.
When we perceive the essence of this law, we notice that jezyah is for
that group of the People of the Book who live under the protection of the
Islamic state, who are subject to the Islamic state. The Islamic state
has certain duties towards its nation and likewise, the latter has its
respective duties towards the Islamic state, and the first of these is
to pay taxes to maintain the state budget. These taxes include that which
is taken as zakat and that which is taken as other than zakat in the form
of various taxes that the Islamic government introduces in accordance to
the best Islamic interests. All these must be paid by the people. In case
they do not, then the Islamic government would automatically not be able
to function. There is no governmental, budget which is not fully or partly
financed by the people. Any government to have a budget, must sustain it
either directly or indirectly by taxes.
The second duty of the citizens is to provide soldiers and undertake
sacrifices for the sake of the state. There may be future dangers when
the citizens of the state must help in its defense. If the People of the
Book are living under the protection of the Islamic state they are not
bound to pay those Islamic taxes and are not bound to take part in jihad,
even though any advantages resulting from the jihad will also benefit them.
In accordance with this, when the Islamic government secures the safety
of a people and places them under its protection, whether they are its
own people or not, it requires something in return from them; financial
or other than financial. From the People of the Book, instead of zakat
and the other taxes, it requires the jezyah and even instead of soldiers,
it requires jezyah. So that in early Islam, it was such that whenever the
People of the Book volunteered to come and fight in the ranks of the Muslims
in the interests of the Islamic state and the Muslims, the latter didn't
collect the jezyah and saying that the jezyah was received from them for
the reason that they were not bound to provide soldiers, but, as they had
themselves come forth to fight, that money was theirs and the Islamic state
could not rightfully take it. In the
commentary on the Quran called "Tafsir al-Menar," there are many accounts
from various history books of how the early Muslims took jezyah instead
of soldiers, and how the People of the Book used to be told that since
they were living under the protection of the Islamic state and of the Muslims,
but sending no soldiers (the Muslims would themselves not accept them),
then instead of sending soldiers, they had to pay the jezyah. And if once
in a while the Muslims in certain instances found confidence in them and
accepted their soldiers, they no longer took jezyah from them.
According to this, whether or not jezyah is Arabic or Persian, whether
it is from jaza or from gaziyah, this much is clear: from its
legal meaning it is a reward to the Islamic government from its non-Muslim
People of the Book citizens, in return for the services that it performs
for them and in return for them not having to provide the state with soldiers
and not having to pay taxes.
Now the first problem of how and why Islam stops its jihad for the sake
of jezyah becomes clear. The answer is provided by the question, "Why does
Islam want jihad?" It does not want jihad for the sake of the imposition
of belief it wants jihad for the removal of barriers. When the other side
tells us that it has no wish to fight us, and that it will not create a
barrier to the call of tawhid, and keeps to its word, it is to be ruled
in accordance with this verse:
«And if they incline to peace, then incline to it.» (8:61)
If they have been humbled, and manifest a mind and heart of peace and
compromise, then we are not to be severe anymore.
We are not to say "Oh no. We do not want peace, we are going to fight."
Now that they have come forward to live in peace and concord, we too must
announce the same thing. Of course, now that they want to live with us
under our protection, but do not have to pay any of the Islamic taxes,
nor provide any soldiers, and neither do we have any confidence in their
soldiers, then, in return for our services and protection, we take a simple
tax from them called jezyah.
Some Christian historians like Gustav Le Bon and George Zaydun have
discussed this issue in detail. Will Durant in Vol. II of his series "The
History of Civilization" has also discussed the Islamic jezyah and tells
us that the Islamic jezyah was so trivial an amount that it was even less
than the taxes the Muslims themselves paid and thus there was never any
question of exaction.
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